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The use of information technology by the banking sector has not prevented criminals
from stealing money from banks and organizations that issue plastic cards for the
purposes of obtaining cash and buying goods and services on credit.
Digital evidence and electronic signatures may appear to be
mundane – both to lawyers and lay people, but they affect
everybody that has a bank account or uses a credit or debit
card. The technology now used to deal with money cannot be
considered to be ubiquitous across the globe yet, but the
introduction of ATMs across many countries is now occurring at
speed, especially in African states. The use of information
technology by the banking sector has not prevented criminals
from stealing money from banks and organizations that issue
plastic cards for the purposes of obtaining cash and buying
goods and services on credit. Indeed, criminals now have the
capacity to steal far greater amounts of money than hitherto –
they exchanged the horse for the motor car as a means of
escaping from the scene of a robbery as soon as the technology
permitted, and the more determined now manipulate
customers through social engineering techniques, and take
advantage of the flaws in the technology used by banks.
As the recent banking crisis has illustrated, many people in
control of banks lost sight of what business they were in: risk
(Samuel Johnson (taken from the edition improved by Henry
John Todd, (John Walker, 1836)) defined ‘bank’ as ‘a repository
where money is occasionally lodged; to lay up money in a bank’
and a banker as ‘one who receives money in trust’). Banks deal
with the risks inherent in the control of money, and in the
increasingly complex world that humans have created, banks
and how banks deal with the risks associated with the control
and transfer of money affects everyone; indeed, governments
generally take great care to oversee the mechanisms associated
with the movements and stability of currency.
It is for this reason that customers of banks and governments
ought to take as much interest in the systems used by banks to
provide customers with a service (mainly through ATMs) as do
criminals. In an attempt to reduce the ability of criminals to
steal money from banks, the banks and card issuers have
resorted to more technically complex methods (such as the
adoption of EMV – that is, the inclusion of a chip on the card) of
protecting the mechanisms (e.g. ATMs and Point of Sale
terminals (PoS) that have become ubiquitous) used to dispense
cash or permitting a customer to authorize transactions on their
account. The problem with the increased complexity of the
systems put in place by the banks, as the article by Dr Steven J.
Murdoch illustrates, is that there is a corresponding increase in
the risks associated with the flawed implementation of such
systems.
In addition, the courts have not necessarily treated the
delicate balance between the risks that should be borne by the
banks and those risks the banks prefer to transfer to the
customer. The decisions in the case of 29.06.2000, 2 Ob
133/99v of the Oberste Gerichtshof (Supreme Court of Austria)
and Civil case No. 3K-3-390/2002 from the Lietuvos
Aukšciausiasis Teismas (Supreme Court of Lithuania) represent
a more realistic and accurate analysis of the position on legal
liability than the judgment in the case of 5 October 2004, XI ZR
210/03 (published BGHZ 160, 308-321) by the Bundesgerichtshof
(German Federal Court of Justice), each of which are translated
into English and included in this edition of the Review.
In this respect, misunderstandings continue in relation to the
technology and how the technology is analysed in legal terms.
Consider, by way of example, the report ‘Checking out chip and
PIN: The Northampton trial report 2003’ (Chip and PIN
Programme Management Organisation).1 In this report, the
authors provide a list of questions and answers, one of which is
set out below (on page 21):2
What is PIN?
A PIN (Personal Identification Number) is your 4-digit number
which proves you are who you say you are. You tap in your
PIN to verify a payment.
Note the word ‘verify’ in relation to a payment usually means
‘check that it has been made’. In this example, it seems ‘verify’
actually means ‘authorize.’ (Note that PINs can be between 4
and 12 digits; 5 digits are used in South Africa and 6 in France).
This statement indicates a misunderstanding of what a PIN is
and what it purports to do.
In the same way that a manuscript signature can be forged,
PINs are forged every day, as some customers of banks are aware.
If the assertion noted above were correct, then the fact that a
transaction was carried out using the correct PIN would
automatically mean it was the person to whom the card was
issued who typed the PIN into a key pad. But a PIN can obviously
be forged (that is, a thief can discover the correct PIN and then use
it), so the forgery obviously does not prove that the person who
typed in the correct PIN is the person to whom the card was
1 Available at hppt://www.chipandpin.co.uk/reflib/
northampton_trial_report.pdf.
2 The editor acknowledges the very helpful
comments and suggestions made by Nicholas
Bohm in respect of the discussion that follows.
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issued. The issuers of plastic cards require customers to use a PIN
in the full knowledge that when a PIN is forged, the issuer cannot
tell the forged PIN from a PIN keyed in to a machine by the actual
customer. That the card issuers have chosen to use such a flimsy
method of ascertaining their customers’ agreement to a
transaction with a machine is their problem, and not the
customer’s – at least that is the legal position. But as any person
who has had money removed from their account by a thief will be
aware, making the card issuer understand that it was not the
customer who withdrew the money can be far from easy.
A PIN on its own is not capable of proving the person is who
they say they are – in fact, a PIN even with some other form of link
with a name (such as a credit card) is not capable of proving who
you say you are. Both PINs and cards can be stolen and used by
criminals without any fault on the part of their proper user.
The function of a PIN is to verify a payment 
Arguably, the PIN combines two functions. Before considering
the two functions, consider the requirements of the card issuer.
The card issuer needs to know if the customer to whom the card
has been issued is the person interacting with the ATM or PoS.
If the bank or card issuer is satisfied on these two points, then
the bank has satisfied itself that it is dealing either with the
customer to whom the card was issued, or at least the card and
PIN is in the possession of another person that has both the
card and PIN with the authority of the customer.
Thus the bank or card issuer needs sufficient evidence to
satisfy itself that the card is legitimate, and the card is in the
possession of the customer to whom it was issued (or a person
authorized by the customer to use the card). For the card issuer
to be satisfied of these two facts, a sequence of events takes
place for ATM transactions. They are summarized below.
Interrogation of the card
The first aim of the card issuer is to have sufficient evidence
from the computer systems to demonstrate that the card issued
to the customer is the card the computer systems are
interacting with, and not a forged card. The ATM terminal
interrogates the card to determine which technology it should
use for the transaction (magnetic stripe or chip).
Verification of the card holder
The ATM prompts the customer to enter the PIN. The issuing
bank compares the PIN to their records, and a message is sent
back to the ATM to indicate whether the verification was
successful. It does not follow that this process succeeds in all
completed ATM transactions.
Authentication of the card
First, it should be noted that it does not follow that this process
succeeds in all completed ATM transactions. With an EMV card
(also called Chip & Pin in the UK), the chip will normally be
interrogated to enable the issuer to determine whether the card
is the one issued to the customer. If the chip is not read or
cannot be read, the ATM will probably read the magnetic stripe
on the card to perform a magnetic stripe fallback
authentication, where the ATM sends the contents of the
magnetic stripe to the issuing bank, via the card scheme
network. The issuing bank will then verify whether it contains
the correct information. Providing the bank or card issuer
received satisfactory responses from either the chip or the
magnetic stripe, and the PIN is correct, then the person at the
machine is then free to undertake transactions on the account.
The functions of a PIN
Thus the functions of a PIN can now be analyzed. The first
function of the PIN is to act as a means of authentication. In this
respect, a PIN demonstrates that the person that keyed in the
PIN knows the correct PIN.
The second function of a PIN is to act as a form of electronic
signature. Once the computer systems of the bank or card
issuer are satisfied that the card is legitimate and the PIN is the
correct PIN of the card holder, then the person at the ATM or
PoS can undertake any activity on the account that is permitted
within the mandate and within the limitations of the technology.
It must be right to say that the PIN, even though it is offered
to the machine before a transaction is effected, acts as a
signature to verify the customer’s authority to make a payment
or other form of transaction. In this respect, the presentation of
a card to an ATM, and the input of a PIN can be likened to a
cheque that is written out by the account holder, signed, and
then presented to the cashier at the bank. The customer
completes the action necessary to request a payment in
advance of the payment being made by the cashier, and then
signs the cheque in the presence of the cashier – all before
receiving acknowledgement that a transaction has been
authorized. In this respect, the PIN is a form of electronic
signature.
Arguably, the legal analysis is relatively straight forward. The
more difficult issue is to force the bank or card issuer to adduce
the digital evidence, and then for the lawyer to test it effectively
by cross-examination.
